Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Quotes: symbols for highlighting parts in a sentence or text. Often for identification of quotations or for distancing. For philosophical problems see also mention/use, quasi-quotation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Quotation Marks - Dictionary of Arguments
VII (f) 112 Quotes/Quine: square quotation marks: notation [] only upper half: is an expression marked as a noun m- variables are nouns if they occupy the place of names of sentences (Greek letters). See also Quote/Disquotation, Second Intention. X 33 Quotation Marks/Quine: it depends on them whether we are talking about words or the world. Quotation Marks/Quine: create the name of a sentence containing a name of snow, namely "snow". Truth-Predicate/Quine: by calling the sentence true, we call the snow white. Truth-Predicate: cancels the quotes. Sentence: we can say it simply by pronouncing it. Therefore we can dispense with quotation marks and truth-predicates. Truth-Predicate/Quine: we need it if we want to claim an infinite set of sentences that we can only define by talking about the sentences. Example: "All sentences of the form 'p or not p' are true". We need it to restore the reference to an object when we have used semantic ascension for generalization. >Truth Predicate/Quine Quotation Marks/Quine: the Tarski example cannot be generalized as follows: p' is true iff p because if you write the schema letter 'p' in quotation marks, you get the name of the 16th letter of the alphabet and not a general expression for sentences. III 67 Quotation Marks/Quine: form names (designations) e.g. we write "lies close to" not between Mannheim and Heidelberg, but between their designations (names). III 68 Rhyme/Quine: "Erden" (earth) rhymes with "werden" (become). Without quotation marks it would not only be wrong but ungrammatic and pointless. See also >Implication/Quine, >Conditional/Quine, >Mention/Quine, >Use._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Quotation Marks
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28